First filter test of market power in Finnish food retailing sector by Niemi, Jyrki S. & Xing, Liu
First filter test of market power in Finnish food retailing sector  
 
Niemi Jyrki. 
1,  Xing Liu. 
1 
 











PAPER PREPARED FOR THE 116
TH EAAE SEMINAR "Spatial 
Dynamics in Agri-food Systems: Implications for Sustainability and 










Copyright 2010  Niemi Jyrki. ,  Xing Liu.    All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies.
 
   2 
 
First filter test of market power in Finnish food retailing sector  
 
Niemi Jyrki. 
1,  Xing Liu. 
1 
 
1 MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland  
 
  Abstract— Buyer power and competition policy in 
food supply chains has emerged as an important 
economic issue and a highly sensitive item on the policy 
agenda all around the world. Claims that large retailers 
and food companies are depressing farm prices because 
of their market power have been made in many 
countries around the world (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 
2009). Arising concentration of retailer sector increases 
the concern of existence and gradual growth of buyer 
power in this sector. The key reason is that the growing 
buyer power may have the effect of considerably 
distorting both retail and producer competition, and 
eventually it may damage economic welfare. In Finland, 
the increased concentration of the retail sector, with 
fewer outlets and the growth of the large supermarket 
chains, has been particularly fast. The two leading 
Finnish retail chains of food and daily goods increased 
their market share from 55 per cent in 1990 to nearly 75 
per cent in 2008 (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2009).. 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible 
existence of buyer power in Finnish food retail food 
industry. In details, we follow an approach used by 
Lloyd et al (2009) to measures oligopoly and oligopsony 
market power in the Finnish food retail industry. This 
offers a ‘first-filter’ test of price data that may be used 
as part of the preliminary analyses into the presence of 
buyer power in food markets. In practice, we apply a 
vector error correction mechanism (VECM) to perform 
two-stage tests: First is to test the hypothesis of 
cointegration between the supply and demand price 
indices with expected signs for the coefficients 
irrespective of the degree of retail competition; second is 
to test the null hypothesis of the perfect competition. The 
model also serves as a useful device for characterising 
how prices are transmitted in food market, albeit in 
simplified form.  
 
Keywords— concentration, market power, VECM 
I. INTRODUCTION  
  Buyer power and competition policy in food supply 
chains has emerged as an important economic issue 
and a highly sensitive item on the policy agenda all 
around the world. Claims that large retailers and food 
companies are depressing farm prices because of their 
market power have been made in many countries 
around the world (Swinnen ans Vandeplas 2009). 
Arising concentration of retailer sector increases the 
concern of existence and gradual growth of buyer 
power in this sector. The key reason is that the 
growing buyer power may have the effect of 
considerably distorting both retail and producer 
competition, and eventually it may damage economic 
welfare.The Committee of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices defined buyer power as “a situation 
which exists when a firm or a group of firms, either 
because it has a dominant position as a purchaser of a 
product or service or because it has trategic or 
leverage advantages as a result of its size or other 
characteristics, is able to obtian from a supplier more 
favourable terms than those available to other buyers” 
(OECD, 1981) 
  Clearly, the food industry, and the retail sector in 
particular, have consolidated through mergers and 
acquisitions and strategic alliances. Retail buying is 
becoming more and more concentrated, in part 
because retailers have become very large sellers and in 
part because retailers combine their buying activities. 
As a consequence, concentration is higher on the 
buyer side than the seller side throughout Europe 
(Dobson et al. 2003). In Finland, the increased 
concentration of the retail sector, with fewer outlets 
and the growth of the large supermarket chains, has 
been particularly fast. The two leading Finnish retail 
chains of food and daily goods increased their market 
share from 55 per cent in 1990 to nearly 75 per cent in 
2008 (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2009). 
  Abuse of a dominant position in the market is 
frequently mentioned as an explanation for the 
decreasing producer price margins. Yet, proving the 
claims of abuse of market power is rather difficult 
because a large market share does not directly imply a 
large market power. According to the theory of 
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contestable markets (e.g. Baumol et al., 1982), a 
market characterized by a small number of sellers – or 
even a monopoly – can exhibit competitive pricing if 
has low barriers of entry and exit. Retail consolidation 
may also lead to lower retail prices because high buyer 
power can lead to better bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the main suppliers, which may feed through to lower 
consumer prices eventually (e.g. Chen 2003, Dobson 
and Waterson 1997). Efficiency will also increase if 
transaction costs are substantially lower as a result of 
high market power (Shervani et al. 2007). 
 
  Widening price spreads between retail and producer 
prices of food are not themselves indicative of 
imperfect competition, since competitive factors, such 
as rising marketing costs may be responsible. The 
analysis by Kuosmanen and Niemi  (2009) suggests 
that there are many plausible reasons for the common 
declining pattern of producer price margins, which is 
worth keeping in mind when interpreting the price 
spread calculations. Reasons listed for the observed 
growth in price spreads include 1) increased degree of 
processing, 2) better food hygiene, 3) differences in 
productivity growth across sectors, 4) agricultural 
policy reforms, 5) international trade, and 6) imperfect 
competition. 
Generally two approaches have been taken in 
identifying and estimating oligopoly (or oligopsony) 
market power: structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
studies and new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO) studies. SCP studies have mainly used cross-
sectional data to estimate the relationship between 
price-cost margins and concentration ratios to draw 
inferences about the presence of market power, while 
NEIO studies have generally tended to find some 
statistical evidence of market power by focussing on 
the determinants of the gap between price and the 
marginal cost (Wohlgenant 2001). 
  There are number of empirical studies relating retail 
prices to concentration ratios of retailers. However, 
they arrive at very diverging conclusions. On the one 
hand, Hall et al. (1979), Marion et al. (1983), and 
various studies by Cotterill (Cotterill 1986; Cotterill 
and Harper 1995; Cotterill 1999) find that there is a 
positive correlation between retail concentration and 
food prices. On the other hand, Kauffmann and Handy 
(1989), and Binkley and Connor (1998) find a 
negative or insignificant correlation between 
concentration and food prices. Likewise, Binkley et al. 
(2002) find “little compelling evidence that 
consolidated markets engage in non-competitive 
pricing behaviour.” 
  In this paper, we follow an approach used by Lloyd 
et al (2009) to measures oligopoly and oligopsony 
market power in the Finnish food retail industry. It 
offers a ‘first-filter’ test of price data that may be used 
as part of the preliminary analyses into the presence of 
buyer power in food markets. The model also serves 
as a useful device for characterising how prices are 
transmitted in food market, albeit in simplified form. 
Furthermore, it forms the basis for determining the 
appropriate econometric approach and the 
interpretation of the key variables used to identify the 
existence of possible oligopsony power. 
II. RECENT TRENDS IN FINNISH 
FOOD RETAILING 
 The operating environment of Finnish food 
economy changed radically in 1995 when Finland 
joined the EU. The commitment to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU led to 
unprecedented upheaval of the economic environment 
of the Finnish food chain. It was no longer possible to 
regulate the market price level of agricultural products 
through national border protection and export 
subsidies. The minimum prices of agricultural 
products guaranteed by the EU are much lower than 
the producer prices paid in Finland before the EU 
membership, and the prices also vary more than 
before. 
  The retail price of food fell, on average, by 11 % in 
1995 when Finland joined the EU even though the 
value added tax was raised. The reduction was caused 
by the decrease in the producer prices to the same 
level as in the other Member States and liberalisation 
of imports from the EU countries. The prices of cereal 
and meat products fell the most dramatically. As a 
result, from 1995 until 2008 the food prices in nominal 
terms rose by 25.2%. During the same period the 
general consumer price index rose by 24.4%, which 
means that the real price paid for food in 2008 was on 
about the same level as in 1995 (Niemi and Ahlstedt 
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2009). In other words, the long-term trend in food 
prices has followed the general consumer price trends. 
  The EU membership also clearly reinforced the 
position of retail sector in the food chain relative to the 
domestic raw material production and food industry. 
The retail sector is able to take advantage of the 
competition between the domestic food companies and 
foreign ones. Structural changes in the retail trade are 
directly influencing the market opportunities of food 
producers in four ways: through (1) concentration, (2) 
chaining, (3) discount stores and (4) private labels. As 
a result of the concentration in the retail trade sector, 
very large units, hypermarkets, have conquered market 
shares from smaller units (Koistinen and Vesala 
2006). The concentration is reflected both in the rapid 
decrease in the number of retail outlets and in the 
market shares of the leading chains. From 1995 until 
2007 the share of hypermarkets in the sales grew from 
15 to 25 % and the share of large supermarkets from 
20 % to as high as 33 %. In the beginning of 2008 the 
total number of retail outlets selling groceries and 
daily goods was 3,922 and 58% of the sales took place 
in the 673 largest stores. The introduction of euro in 
2002 speeded up the disappearance of village and 
local shops. 
  In recent years significant reorganisations have 
taken place among the largest chains. The competition 
for the market in groceries and daily consumer good is 
more and more clearly a case between two main 
players. The market share of the S Group has 
increased rapidly over the past years. In 2008, the S 
Group managed to raise its market share again 
reaching 42.4%. The share of the K Group has been 
diminishing in the past few years, although this trend 
stopped in 2007 and there was some growth in their 
market share. In 2008 the sales of the K Group grew 
by 6%, which is less than the average. As a result, the 
market share of K Group decreased slightly, to 33.7% 
in 2008. 
  The share of the third largest chain Tradeka also 
experienced a fall in its market share from 11.9% in 
2006-07 to 11.3% in 2008. The retail operations of 
Tradeka and Wihuri Group’s Ruokamarkkinat were 
merged in 2005. At the end of 2008 Tradeka changed 
its name into Suomen Lähikauppa Oy (Finland’s Local 
Store), which reflects the new company strategies. The 
control by the chain will be eased and with 550 Siwa 
and 187 Valintatalo stores the company aims to be 
perceived as Finland’s leading chain of local stores. 
  The largest chain in the category of other companies 
is the German discount giant Lidl, which has spread 
rapidly on the Finnish market. In 2008 the share of 
Lidl was estimated at 5.1%, which was slightly higher 
than the year before, when it was 4.7%. 
  The large food chains consist of independent retail 
operators who compete on the local markets, while the 
wholesale and purchasing operations within the chain 
are strongly concentrated. Large chains take advantage 
of their negotiation power in their supply contracts 
with food processing companies. In both leading 
chains the share of the concentrated purchases has 
risen to more than 80%, leaving very little room for 
local purchases by the retail operators. Of local foods 
mainly some bakery products, fresh meat and fresh 
cheeses have gained access to the shelves (Niemi and 
Ahlstedt 2009). 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL AND 
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
  As mentioned in the introduction, this study utilizes 
a theoretical approach used by McCorriston (2001) 
and Lloyd et al (2009) exploiting the presence of 
exogenous shocks in order to identify the presence of 
buyer power on both upstream and downstream prices. 
In their theoretical framework, firms are assumed to 
produce a homogeneous product and pursue quantity-
setting strategies. In addition, the model allows us 
only to detect the existence of market power but not 
the degree of buyer power. The detection of buyer 
power simply depends on how the incidence of shocks 
affects both sets of prices. The model presented here 
follows the standard specification of equilibrium 
displacement models as in framework of Gardner 
(1975), Hollowway (1991), McCorriston (2001) and 
Lloyd’s et al. (2009), which are static models  of 
marketing firm behaviour in agriculture can be 
partitioned according to the assumptions made 
regarding the role played by the farm product in 
producing the finished consumer product. 
The inverse retail demand form is given by: 
 
   ) , ( D Q h R                     (1), 
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where R is the price of the retail price of the good and 
Q is food output the retailers sell to consumers and D 
is a exogenous demand shifter (which represents the 
source of the demand shock affecting the retailing 
sector).  
 
The input supply functions for the agricultural input A,  
in inverse form, are given by 
 
                       (2),  ) , ( S A l P 
where P represents the price of A. The variable S is the 
exogenous supply shifter in  the farm supply equation. 
 
The food industry, for example a representative retail 
firm, uses the agricultural raw material maximise its 
profits, given by the following function: 
 
   ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i Q C A A P Q Q R           (3), 
where   represents the cost of all the 
agricultural inputs. In this theoretical frame work, this 
firm uses agricultural inputs in combination with other 
variable inputs to produce food product. To simplify 
the algebra in order to manage it, these non-
agricultural inputs are subsumed into a single “other 
cost” input, that is  . In addition, constant returns to 
scale in distribution are assumed. Thus the first order 
condition for profit maximisation gives 
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here we assume a fixed proportions technology, 
i.e. i i Q A   , where  is the input-output coefficient. 
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using linear functional forms for both demand
1 and 
supply function with exogenous demand shifter D, we 
get: 
  
bD aR h Q                      (6) 
kA l P                      (6a), 
 
and  A, representing the supply input could be 
determined by food output to the retailers Q and the 
exogenously determined supply shifter S:  
 
   S Q A    
 
 Setting  up  1    in order to get the explicit 





























 “ A key feature of any model of imperfect 
competition is the manner in which rival firms respond 
or react to one another” Sexton and Lavoie (2001)2. 
Empirically, most authors of static structural market 
models of imperfect competition in agriculture have 
used the paradigm of conjectural variations. 
(Holloway, 1991; Mccorriston et.al ,2001; Lloyd et al. 
2009). With n equal-sized firms with identical cost 
structures, we could rewrite (7) by using aggregate 
conjecture elasticity




















   ,  
as 
                                                           
1 Empirically, the linear and the log-linear forms are among the 
most common as demand curve the demand cuve could be 
expressed by a general Box-Cox transformation given by 
, when  ) / 1 ( / ) 1 (  
      R a h Q  = 1 we have the 
linear demand case. 
2 Sexton R.J. and N. Lavoie 2001, Handbook of agricultural 
economics, Volume 1B, chapter 15, 888. 
3  i i Q Q    /  is the conjectural variation parameter for firm i, 
Assuming n equal-sized firms with identical cost structural as is 
common with industrial organisation models of this type, there are 
certain assumptions underlying this process of aggregation, in 
aggregating the conjectural elasticities, it is assumed that the 
conjectural variation parameters are identical across all firms. 
(Cowling and Waterson, 1976) 
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  M P Q
a
Q k R    

     (8), 
   If buyer power exists then the spread between retail 
and producer supply prices behaves differently since 
price setting by the sector with buyer power will be 
reflected in the mark down that the firms can earn, and 
so affects the spread. Hence, where buyer power 
exists, market shocks have a differential impact at 
each stage in the marketing chain and thus determine 
the behaviour of the spread between prices at different 
vertical levels in addition to marketing costs. In effect, 
shocks to the underlying supply and demand functions 
are mediated through buyer power parameters and thus 
give rise to predictable effects on the spread. In the 
absence of buyer power, the effect of shocks is 
common at all vertical market levels so that the spread 
is simply determined by marketing costs. 
where M is a composite variable that represents all 
other costs that affect the retail-farm price margin. 
More generally,    may be thought of as an index of 
buyer power. If  0   , then we have competitive 
behaviour, and if  1   , then we have collusive 
behaviour. Therefore, if there is buyer power in a 
market, then the equation (8) could be reduced to: 
 
  M P R                   (9), 
 
  To allow for changes in marketing cost M,   M 
could be explained by a linear marketing cost function 
form depending on a constant x and a cost of inputs 
E  as follows: 
 
  E x M                 (10) 
 
  Thus the equation (9) becomes: 
 
                                              (11),  rE x P R   
      
Lloyd et al. (2009) have developed a model of price 
transmission in a two-level (i.e. retail and farm-gate) 
vertical market that explicitly allows for shocks in 
both the demand and supply functions for a food 
product. The theoretical framework delivers an 
equation for the determination of the price spread in 
which the impact of these shocks appears with definite 
sign in the presence of oligopsony power. This 
provides the theoretical basis for a simple empirical 
test of the presence or otherwise of perfect 
competition. Writing the margin equation in 
unrestricted form (i.e. in terms of prices), an empirical 
testable equation given by Lloyd et al. (2009) is 
following: 
clearly, the spread between the retailing price and 
producer price in a perfectly competitive industry is 
attributed solely to marketing costs under competitive 
conditions. In this case, the exogenous shifters from 
both demand side and supply side have no impact on 
determining the spread. However, when  0   , the 
function of (8) will be transformed in relation to 
demand and supply shocks  provided by equation 6 
and 6(a) in the following form: 
 
S D M P R 4 3 2 1 0                (13), 
 
where R is the retail price and P is the producer price 
of the good under consideration, M is a composite 
variable that represents all other costs that affect the 
retail-farm price margin, D is a general demand 
shifter, and S is the exogenous shifter in the farm 
supply equation. The expected signs for the 
coefficients are 1 > 0, 2 > 0 irrespective of the 
degree of retail competition. The test for the rejection 
  
 
) 1 )( 1 (
) )( 1 ( ) )( / 1 (
ak
kS E x ak bD h k a
P R
 




                     (12) 
 
of perfect competition is whether the coefficients on 
the remaining variables in the retail-producer spread 
equation are statistically significant. 
t t m t m t t t v X X X X                     2 2 1 1    (14),
                 
where xt is a ( k ×1) vector of jointly determined I(1) 
variables, Zt is a ( d ×1) vector of deterministic terms 
(constants, trends and centred seasonals) and each i Φ 
( i = 1,K, p ) and each ψ (I = 1, …, m) Φ are ( k × k ) 
In the empirical section, it is assumed that the data 
may be approximated by a VAR (p) model,  
   7 
and ( k × d ) matrices of coefficients to be estimated 
using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data. vt is a ( k ×1) 
vector of n.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-
diagonal covariance matrix, Σ. 
 
  The presence of a price transmission relationship 
between retailer and producer is indicated by the 
detection of cointegration among the variables in xt. 
Rearranging (12) into its error correction form, 
    
    (15),  t t t i m t t v D X X X            1
' 
we test for cointegration using Johansens’s (1988) 
maximum likelihood procedure in which attention 
focuses on the ( k × r ) matrix of co-integrating 
vectors, comprising β , that quantify the ‘long-run’ (or 
equilibrium) relationships between the variables in the 
system and the ( k × r ) matrix of error correction 
coefficients, α , the elements of which load deviations 
from equilibrium (i.e. β'xt-m ) into Δxt, for correction. 
The Γi coefficients in (3) estimate the short-run effect 
of shocks on Δxt, and thereby allow the short and 
long-run responses to differ. 
 
  When a single cointegrating relationship is detected 
between retail and producer prices, formal testing of 
the significance of the supply and demands shocks is 
undertaken to investigate whether buyer power is 
present. If the vertical market for a product is perfectly 
competitive, retail and producer prices may be 
expected to form a cointegrated relationship with at 
most marketing costs. Where retailers exert buying 
power, the supply and demand shifters also enter the 
pricing relationship. This then gives rise to a null 
hypothesis of perfect competition which can be 
evaluated empirically by a standard likelihood ratio 
test of the exclusion restrictions on the shifters in the 
cointegrating relation. 
In addition, given that the theoretical model signs the 
parameters in the pricing relation (1), we can offer 
some additional evidence on the possible rejection of 
perfect competition by comparing the estimated signs 
of the shifters in the cointegrating relation with that 
predicted by the theoretical model. 
IV. DATA 
  We apply test method by Lloyd et al. (2009) to 
assess whether we can reject perfect competition in 
Finnish food retailing using widely available market 
level data on food price indices at retail (R) and 
producer (P) levels. The price index series are plotted 
in Figure 1, and the summary of statistics of price 
index series are listed in Table 1. The data sample 
begins in January 1995 and runs until September 2009 
(giving 177 monthly observations). Measures of 
marketing costs are not available and thus given the 
importance of labour costs in food retailing we use an 
index (base year 1995) of real average earnings in the 
Finnish service sector (M) to proxy for these costs. To 
incorporate the impact of farm-level production costs 
the supply shifter (S) represents a real price index 
(base year 1995) of all goods and services purchased 
on Finnish farms. Demand-side shocks is represented 
by general consumer price index on the basis that this 
represents a general demand shifter (D) affecting the 
retailing sector as a whole. R is the retail price and P is 
the producer price of the good under consideration, M 
is a composite variable that represents all other costs 
that affect the retail-farm price margin, D is a general 
demand shifter, and S is the exogenous shifter in the 
farm supply equation behaviour), it is however 
noteworthy if only because growing spread appear to 
be the norm over the sample period. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the index series 
Descr. R  P  D  S  M 
Mean 108.6  96.5  111  112.8  131 
Median  108.5   95   129.6   112.4   108 
S.D   8.7   4.5   20.4   7.77   13.8 
Skew.   0.8   1.97   0.28   0.18   1.2 
Kurt.   3   5.69   1.89   1.9   3.8 
Obers.   177   177   177   177   177 
 
  Obviously, price index representing producer price 
has maintained very much in the same level within the 
sample year, given all other index series have shown a 
clearly increasing trend over the years, especially 
among which marketing cost labelled by M grew the 
most. This tendency for producer price index and 
other indices to diverge over time gives rise to a 
widening in the index spread particularly after year 
2002 (See Figure 2). While growth in the price spread 
is not in itself indicative of buyer power as marketing 
cost such as labour cost may be the cause for the 
phenomenon (Lloyd et. al. 2009). Nevertheless, it is a 
necessary condition for the existence of buyer power. 
Thus, further investigation on the existence of buyer 
power including related factors such as marketing cost 
should be carefully carried out. 
RESULTS  
  To decide whether VAR(p) or VECM  is proper 
model for our analysis, we begin with a descriptive 
analysis of the charaterisitic of individual prices index 
series drafted in Figure 1. In other words, we have to 
examine the stationarity properties of the univariate 
time series. The series is integrated of order d 
(denoted I(d) if it attains stationarity after differencing 
d times. If the series is I(1) it is deemed to have a unit 
root.  Stationarity of the price processes is tested using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (1976) and 
complementary KPSS test    (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin,1992).  
 
  Inspection of Figure 1 suggests that the series 
possess a increasing rend that characterized the 
random walk I(1) model. Thus we consider 
performing the unit root tests with two different 
restricted structures: with intercept and with intercept 
and trend.  
 
  Result of unit root test in level form is reported in 
Table 2. All the test indicates that all of the index 
series restricted on intercept are non-stationary, and 
further test on the first difference shows stationarity 4, 
which suggest that the index series are I(1) with either 
intercept or with intercept and trend. Given that the 
data are all integrated in first order, we now analyze 
the price transmission between retailing price and 
producer supply price by VECM model defined by 
equation (3). Thus the second step of our analysis is to 
test the cointegration relationship among the index 
series. 
 
 The result of Johanson cointegration test is 
presented in Table 3. The Akaike Information is used 
to determine the optimal order of lags (3 lags for each 
series). Both trace statistics and Max-eigenvalue 
indicate that a single cointegrating vector (r=1) is 
found significant, whether or not the linear trend 
restriction included. Further, under sequential testing, 
the first rejection failure occurs while using the model 
without trend and, thus, we accept the model without 
trend as appropriate. We further check the 
cointegrating residuals for autocorrelation and 
trending test, and the results appear to be satisfactory. 
 
  Next, Table 4 reports the parameters of the 
cointegrating vectors normalised on retail price index 
obtained from model 3. The result shows that β1 >0, 
and β2 >0, which is in accordance with the theoretical 
model 1. However, it is noteworthy that the parameter 
of coefficient of M representing marketing cost shows 
statistically insignificance. This implies that labour 
cost alone may not serve the best proxy as a general 
marketing cost variable.  In addition, the signs for the 
existence of buyer power β3 and β4 turn positive and 
negative respectively, which is correctly signed 
according to the predictions in the theoretical model. 
However, the estimated coefficient of supply shifter 




                                                           
1. 
4 The unit root test results on the first difference are not reported 
but are available upon request. 
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Table 2. Unit Root Tests for selected oil prices in EU market 
Test R  P  M  D  S  Critical  values 
ADF (intercept and 








































Notes: ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, test statistics is according to MacKinnon (1996) critical values for 
rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. KPSS is the η-test of Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Asterisk (*), (**) and 




Table 3: Test for Cointegration among R, P, M, D and S index series. 
(i) Constant  included 
Hypothesized No. of 
CEs  Max-Eigenvalue  5% max  Trace statistic  5% trace 
r=0 44.50**  33.88   83.32** 69.82 
r=1  23.56 27.58 38.82  47.86 
r=2 9.07  21.13  15.26  29.80 
r=3 4.98  14.26  6.19  15.49 
r=4 1.21  3.84  1.21  3.84 
(ii) Constant and linear trend included 
Hypothesized No. of 
CEs  Max-Eigenvalue  5% max  Trace statistic  5% trace 
r=0 44.69**  38.33  94.34**  88.80 
r=1  28.06 32.12 49.64  63.88 
r=2  11.22 25.82 21.57  42.92 
r=3 6.44  19.39  10.36  25.87 
r=5 3.92  12.52  3.92  12.52 
Note: Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) **denotes rejection of hypothesis at 
5% level  
                                                           
2. 
5 Unit root testing and cointegration analysis are conducted using EVIEWS 6. 
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appears to be insignificant. In order to obtain more 
precise statistical significance of coefficients S and 
D, we further perform a set of likelihood ratio tests.  
The results is displayed in Table 5, and clearly the 
null hypothesis of the perfect competition 
( 0 4 3     ) is rejected between producer and 
retailing prices. Meanwhile, we merely note that 
though  4  = 0 cannot be rejected, but it is correctly 
signed according to the theoretical model. Therefore, 
overall the results suggest that the spread between 
producer and retailer prices is not consistent with 
perfectly competitive behaviour and thus might be 
caused by, at least as a candidate amongst other 
factors, the existence of oligopsony power in Finnish 
food retailing. 
 
Table 4. Estimated cointegrating vectors (normalised 
on retail price index) 





cost  (M) 
β2 0.09  (0.07) 
Demand 
shifter index   
(D) 
β3 0.68***  (0.16) 
Supply shifter 
index  (S) 
β4 -0.03  (0.08) 
 
Table 5. Test results for competition 
Hypotheses Values 
H0:  3  =0  10.02*** [0.002] 
H0:  4  =0  0.13[0.71] 
H0:  0 4 3       11.12***[0.00] 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have applied the test method by 
Lloyd et al. (2009) to test the presence of buyer power 
in vertically-related Finnish food markets. As 
explained by Lloyd et al. (2009) the approach is 
simple and transparent yet delivers a statistical test 
derived from a theoretically-consistent basis. 
Furthermore, the test demands relatively little in terms 
of data and is implemented using standard techniques 
of modern time-series analysis. 
 
  Drawing on data on price indices at retail (R) and 
producer (P) levels, we showed that the hypothesis of 
perfect competition can be rejected, implying that the 
Finnish market is characterised by buyer power by the 
Lloyd’s et al. (2009) measure. Of course, the result 
cannot be interpreted as being conclusive of the use of 
buyer power in Finnish food retailing. Clearly, 
econometric tests of the sort have limitations. Data is 
subject to measurement problems, particularly 
regarding the quality of proxies that are available to 
account for changes in sector-specific marketing costs 
(demand and supply shocks) are not to be taken 
lightly. It should also be stressed that the test does not 
allow the degree or economic significance of market 
power to be measured, merely whether it exists. 
 
  However, the method proposed by Lloyd et al. 
(2009) is both familiar to applied economists and 
readily implemented, and delivers a ‘first pass’ test 
that when used in combination with other evidential 
indicators, can be useful in contributing to uncovering 
the existence of buyer power in the vertical food 
chain. 
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